

EX-POST LIABILITY RULES IN MODERN PATENT LAW

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Rosa CASTRO BERNIERI



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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACTA	Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
BIRPI	International Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual Property
CAFC	U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
CC	(Italian) Civil Code
CPC	(Italian) Civil Procedural Code
CPI	(Italian) Industrial Property Code
EPLA	European Patent Litigation Agreement
EPO	European Patent Office
GADI	Giurisprudenza Annotata di Diritto Industriale
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
IP	Intellectual Property
Paris Convention	Paris Convention on the Protection of Industrial Research and Development
R&D	Research and Development
TRIPS	Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
USPTO	United States Patent and Trademarks Office
WIPO	World Intellectual Property Organization
WTO	World Trade Organization

