

THE PRIVATIZATION OF
WARFARE AND INHERENTLY
GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS

Private Military Companies in Iraq and
the State Monopoly of Regulated Force

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**The Privatization of Warfare and Inherently Governmental Functions: Private
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Cover image: © zabelin – Thinkstock

ISBN 978-1-78068-379-9
D/2016/7849/32
NUR 828

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

There are many people to thank for their contribution to the creation of this dissertation. Firstly, many thanks must go to Peter W. Singer, Senior Fellow and Director of the Brookings Institute's Foreign Policy Studies Program, and author of one of the first books to analyze the consequences of the use of private military companies. A single email exchange was all it took to encourage further research into what I suspect may be a private trend within both the security and energy sector. I must also thank Dr. Ted Bikin-Kita, professor of African Studies at Webster University, Geneva, for much of his time and a lengthy discussion about Libya, oil and private military companies. My thanks also go out to Marie-Louise Tougas, Legal Advisor for the International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, for her contribution to my ambitious attempt at proposing a new regulatory framework and William Tuceling at the U.S. Government Accountability Office for the latest report on U.S. involvement in Iraq. Last but not least, I must thank three individuals who cannot be named. First off, I am most grateful for my first face-to-face interview with an International Humanitarian Law expert and her colleague in Geneva, which helped me fill in the gaps of my original outline. Further, many thanks go to a key manager in the oil industry, who gave me more information than I ever expected on how the energy sector is becoming militarized. Finally, I must thank my dearest wife, Arwa and my mother for their support.

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