

Tobias Heldt

A European Legal Framework for Nuclear Liability

Rethinking Current Approaches

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ABBREVIATIONS

ABGB	Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch
ALARP	As Low As Reasonably Practicable
CDCIR	Community Documentation Centre on Industrial Risks
CJEU	Court of Justice of the European Union
CLC	Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage
CSC	Convention on Supplementary Compensation
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
ECH	European Chemicals Agency
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
ENSREG	European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group
EPZ	Elektriciteits Produktiemaatschappij Zuid-Nederland
EU	European Union
HPC	Hinkley Point C
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IBER	Insurance Block Exemption Regulation
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IPPC	Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control
MAPP	Major Accident Prevention Policy
MARPOL	International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution From Ships
MARS	Major Accident Reporting System
NEA	Nuclear Energy Agency
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NPP	Nuclear Power Plant
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ONR	Office for Nuclear Regulation
OPA	Oil Pollution Act
SDR	Special Drawing Rights
SOLAS	International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
SOS	Sudden Oil Spills
TEU	Treaty on European Union
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States

